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for Abandoned Mine Drainage
INTRODUCTION
Drainage from abandoned mining areas makes up a substan-
tial portion of the acid mine drainage which pollutes Appa-
lachia's waters. I When a mining area is reclaimed properly
drainage from the area generally will not pose a major threat to
the environment; however, if reclamation is not completed prop-
erly, the drainage can remain highly acidic and contain large
quantities of sediment many years after mining operations have
ceased.2 Although coal mine operators will probably remain li-
able for the damage caused by drainage from their past mining
operations and responsible for its abatement,3 if the property on
which an abandoned mine is located has been sold in the interim,
a more difficult issue arises-whether one who merely owns land
from which mine drainage emanates is responsible for the abate-
ment of the pollution.
This Note examines methods by which such responsibility
may be imposed. Coal mine drainage and the techniques used to
control it will be discussed briefly followed by an examination of
abatement responsibility under the common law doctrine of pub-
lic nuisance, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 4 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 5 and the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.6 For reasons
which will be discussed, the federal common law of nuisance is
I According to 46 Fed. Reg. 3136, 3144 (1981), "it has been estimated that 78% of
all acid mine drainage in Appalachia is caused by post-mining discharges." (citing Com-
monwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 371 A.2d 461 (Pa. 1977)).
2Id.
3 See generally Rogers, Acid Coal Mine Drainage- The Perpetual Treatment Prob-
lem, 1 E. MiN. L. FOUND. § 6.04 (1980).
4 30 U.S.C. 55 1201-1328 (Supp. IV 1980).
5 33 U.S.C. §5 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
6 42 U.S.C. 55 6901-6987 (1976).
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not a viable theory of recovery. The issue of whether imposition
of responsibility upon a mere owner constitutes a taking without
just compensation in violation of the fifth8 or fourteenth amend-
ments9 is beyond the scope of this Note. It is important to point
out, however, that the application of the doctrines discussed here
raises this major issue. 10
I. Acm MINE DRAINAGE
Drainage from abandoned mines can occur as surface runoff
of rainwater from a surface mining site or as seepage, or
leachate, from an underground mine. " All coal contains a cer-
tain amount of sulfur, usually in the form of pyrite, a sulfide of
iron. The acid in mine drainage is generally sulfuric acid, formed
by oxidation of pyrite when coal is exposed to water and oxy-
gen.12.This acid-forming reaction creates a second component of
mine drainage, iron hydroxides, which also contribute to the pol-
lution problem. 13 When the mine drainage reaches a stream, the
iron, which is only slightly soluble in water, precipitates and
forms the material known as "yellow-boy."'4 Other minerals,
such as aluminum, copper, zinc, magnesium and manganese,
also may be contained in the mine drainage."
7 See notes 27-48 infra and accompanying text discussing the inapplicability of fed-
eral common law of nuisance.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10 For a discussion of the issue in the context of the case of Commonwealth v. Barnes
& Tucker Co., 371 A.2d at 461 and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. IV 1980), see Rogers, supra note 3, at § 6.08.
n Broughton, Koza & Selway, Acid Mine Drainage and the Pennsylvania Courts, 11
DuQ. L. REv. 495, 496 (1972-73) [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Acid Mine Drainage];
Note, Environmental Law-Acid Mine Drainage, 65 W. VA. L. REv. 508, 508-09 (1973-
74).
12 T. Simonyi, D. Akers, Jr. & W. Grady, The Character and Utilization of Sludge
From Acid Mine Drainage Treatment Facilities 1 (April 2, 1977) (Technical Report of the
Coal Research Bureau) [hereinafter cited as Sludge Utilization]. Other types of acids also
may be formed as the acid further oxidizes while seeping into water flowing through the
mine. Id. at 497.
13 Id.
14 Rogers, supra note 3, § 6.02. This substance gives the streams which it infiltrates a
reddish or yellow color.
15 Pennsylvania Acid Mine Drainage, supra note 11, at 497; Begley & Williams,
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Approximately 5,700 miles of streams in Appalachia are af-
fected by acid mine drainage. 16 Seventy-eight percent of this
drainage originates from abandoned mines. 17 Statistics such as
these illustrate the magnitude of the problem. Municipal water
supplies may be damaged, as well as private wells located near
mine sites. Aquatic life in nearby streams may be killed or dimin-
ished. Industrial users must treat the water before use or incur
damage to their equipment due to corrosion. 18
Control of mine drainage may be accomplished by
preventing its formation or by treating it to remove the deleteri-
ous substances. 19 Drainage from a surface mine may be pre-
vented by backfilling and compacting the areas where coal has
been removed. This removes air from the exposed pyrites thus
preventing the formation of acids. 2 This method is generally suc-
cessful in preventing formation of acid drainage from surface
mines, but underground mines present a much more difficult
problem.21 Underground mines must be inundated with water
and the openings then sealed. It is effective only if air enters the
mine through natural geological fissures or when subsidence oc-
curs.22
Acid mine drainage may be treated by a number of different
methods.23 By far the most common method in use today is neu-
tralization, which involves treating the water with crushed lime-
Coal Mine Water Pollution: An Add Problem with Murky Solutions, 64 Ky. L.J. 507, 511
(1976-77).
16 Pennsylvania Acid Mine Drainage, supra note 11, at 496.
17 See note 1 supra.
18 Pennsylvania Acid Mine Drainage, supra note 11, at 499.
19 Rogers, supra note 3, § 6.02. The second alternative for control-treatment-pre-
sents the problem of abatement actions of indefinite duration. If proper reclamation pro-
cedures are not employed at the time a mine is closed, acids could continue forming for
many years. See 46 Fed. Reg. 3136, 3144 (1981). At least one study prepared for the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) shows that even if all present and future mines were
to adopt advanced procedure for control of their mine wastes, the water quality in many
areas would not be substantially improved due to the large amounts of acid drainage from
abandoned mines. Id.
20 Rogers, supra note 3, § 6.02.
21 Id.
22 See id.; Pennyslvania Acid Mine Drainage, supra note 11, at 502.
23 See generally Note, supra note 11, at 510 & n.11 (listing several of the more exotic
treatment methods); Pennsylvania Acid Mine Drainage, supra note 11, at 500.
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stone or lime, aeration of the treated water and, finally, settling
of the precipitate formed by the reaction of the limestone and the
acid during aeration. 24 This method has several disadvantages. In
the settling process, a large amount of sludge is formed which
must be disposed of properly.2 Furthermore, after treatment,
the water has an increased hardness which may make it undesir-
able for certain uses.29 Also, this method of treatment is expensive
and can be difficult to implement.
Abatement of acid mine drainage, while costly and difficult,
is obviously necessary. The rest of this Note will address the ques-
tion of whether one who has not created the drainage problem
should be responsible for its abatement.
II. PUBLIC NUISANCE THEORY
The federal common law of nuisance was developed nearly
eighty years ago in Missouri v. Illinois27 and Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper .Co.2 Both of these cases involved pollution which
crossed state borders; the interstate character of the nuisance is
apparently why the United States Supreme Court resorted to
"'principles of federalism" in reaching its decisions in these
cases.29 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Texas v.
Pankey,30 was the first to characterize interstate nuisance theory
as "federal common law." Pankey also involved pollution cross-
ing state borders.
The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukees3 (Milwaukee 1), confirmed that the federal common
law of nuisance was indeed a viable doctrine for recovery in cer-
tain cases involving interstate pollution. 32 Although the Supreme
24 Rogers, supra note.3, § 6.02; Pennsylvania Acid Mine Drainage, supra note 11, at
500.
25 Sludge Utilization, supra note 12, at 3-5, discusses some possible uses for sludge
created in the treatment of acid mine drainage.
2 See Pennysylvania Acid Mine Drainage, supra note 11, at 500-01.
27200 U.S. 496 (1906).
206 U.S. 230 (1907).
29 Comment, Requiem For The Federal Common Law of Nuisance, 11 ENvmL. L.
REP. (ENvrL. L. INsT.) 10,191, 10,191 & n.11 (Oct. 1981).
30 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
3' 406 U.S. 91 (1972).32 The Court stated, "When we deal with air and water in their ambient or inter-
, [Vol. 71
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Court recognized the existence of the federal common law of nui-
sance in Milwaukee I, it also noted its possible preemption by
federal statutory law. 3 The decline of the federal common law of
nuisance doctrine, at least in interstate pollution cases, soon fol-
lowed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Committee for
Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train,3 refused to apply the doc-
trine, stating that "it would be an anomaly to hold that there was
a body of federal common law which proscribes conduct which
the 1972 [Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution] Act of
Congress legitimates."' In City of Milwaukee v. llinoise (Mil-
state aspects, there is a federal common law." Id. at 103 (citing Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d
at 236).
Milwaukee I was an action brought by the State of Illinois against four Wisconsin
cities, the Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee, and thb Metropolitan Sewer-
age Commission of the County of Milwaukee. 406 U.S. at 93. The complaint alleged that
the defendants were discharging daily "some 200 million gallons of raw or inadequately
treated sewerage and other waste materials" into Lake Michigan and sought abatement of
the discharge as a public nuisance. Id.
The Court determined it could hear the case as a permissible exercise of its original
jurisdiction but declined to do so, remanding the case to the federal district court. Id. at
108. However, the Court did say that abatement of interstate water pollution was a
proper cause of action under the federal common law of nuisance, and that "application
of federal common law to abate a public nuisance in interstate or navigable waters is not
inconsistent with the Water Pollution Control Act." Id. at 104. The Court concluded that
Congress in section 10(b) of the Act permitted extra-statutory enforcement of pollution
abatement. Section 10(b) provided: "State and interstate action to abate pollution of inter-
state or navigable waters shall be encouraged and shall not .... be displaced by Federal
enforcement action." Id.
33 The Court stated, "fit may happen that new federal laws and new federal regula-
tions may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that
comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of te suits alleg-
ing creation of a public nuisance by water pollution." Id. at 107.
After Milwaukee 1, the federal common law of nuisance was widely applied to air
and water pollution cases. See, e.g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th
Cir. 1980); Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F. Supp 1035 (D.P.R. 1981).
Both decisions have been vacated-Muskie was vacated subject to a consent agreement
with the federal government in Marquez-Colon v. Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1981)
and Outboard Marine was vacated for reconsideration in light of Milwaukee II, discussed
in notes 36-37 infra and accompanying text. 453 U.S. 917 (1981). See generally Note, Fed-
eral Common Law and Water Pollution: Statutory Preemption or Preservation?, 49
FoanHAm L. Rnv. 500, 501 & nn.6-9 (1980-81).
34 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
1 Id. at 1009. The court declined to enjoin discharges from a city sewer system
which was operating under a permit issued under the authorization of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) stating that "[w]hile state courts are free to apply state nuisance
law more rigidly, a federal court in such a local controversy may not turn to a supposed
body of federal common law to impose stricter standards than the statute provides." Id.
M 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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waukee II), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act (FWPCA) had preempted the federal com-
mon law of nuisance, at least as it related to the claims of the
state of Illinois against the city of Milwaukee for pollution of
Lake Michigan. 37 Then, in Middlesex County Sewerage Author-
ity v. National Sea Clammers Association,w the Supreme Court
held that the FWPCA had entirely preempted the federal com-
mon law of nuisance in the area of water pollution. 39 In light of
the Court's decisions in these cases and lower court decisions
which have relied on them,4" it appears settled that the federal
common law of nuisance no longer can be used as a remedy for
mine drainage.
37 Id. at 317. The Court's ruling was based upon the fact that the 1972 Amendments
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) are comprehensive in establishing
guidelines for the control of every point source of pollution in the nation. Id. at 317-19. See
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1976) (defining "point source"). The Court also explained that the
analysis applied in determining if federal statutes preemptfederal common law is not the
same as the analysis applied when determining if federal statutes preempt state law. The
assumption that the police powers of the states are not to be superseded by federal statute
unless Congress exhibits a clear intent to do so creates a presumption against federal statu-
tory preemption of state law which does not exist in favor of federal common law. 451
U.S. at 316.
The Court's decision in Milwaukee 1I that the FWPCA preempted federal com-
mon law of nuisance in the area of interstate water pollution followed from the fact that
five months after Illinois filed suit for abatement in federal district court as directed by the
Milwaukee I decision Congress passed the 1972 Amendments to the Act. Id. at 310. The
Court concluded that, in passing the Amendments, "Congress has not left the formulation
of appropriate federal standards to the courts through application of often vague and inde-
terminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied
the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by
an expert administrative agency." Id. at 317. The Court then concluded, "The establish-
ment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program by Congress, which certainly did
not exist when [Milwaukee I] was decided, strongly suggests that there is no room for
courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal common law." Id. at 319.
Thus, the "new federal laws" which the Court had predicted in Milwaukee I could pre-
empt federal common law of nuisance had come to pass in the form of the 1972 Amend-
ments. See notes 31-33supra and accompanying text discussing the Milwaukee I decision.
38 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
39 Id. at 21-22. The Court also held that the federal common law of nuisance was
preempted in issues involving coastal waters by the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972,33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-44 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 453 U.S. at 22.
40 In New England Legal Foundation v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981), the
court of appeals relied on Milwaukee II in affirming the dismissal of a federal common
law nuisance claim for air pollution due to the fact that the facility was operating under
the authorization of the EPA. See also In re Oswsego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 317 (2d Cir.
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It has been held, on the authority of Milwaukee II, that the
FWPCA preempted state common law in the area of interstate
pollution;41 but the same is not true for intrastate pollution. A
"savings clause" of the FWPCA expressly provides that the sec-
tion allowing citizen suits shall not restrict "any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or com-
mon law to seek. . . any other relief." 42 This language has been
interpreted, based upon the legislative history, as preserving
state common law actions. 3
Although federal statutory and regulatory schemes have be-
come the primary methods of fixing liability for pollution, state
nuisance law" may still play a major role in determining liability
for pollution from abandoned coal mines. 45 At common law, a
public nuisance is "the doing of or failure to do something that
injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the public, or
works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to
the public." 6 Liability for nuisance may arise from an intention-
al or negligent invasion of the plaintiff's interest or from conduct
which is abnormally dangerous and thereby imposes strict liabil-
ity. Liability rarely arises absent one of these bases.47
1981); United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982); United States v.
Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981); Love v. New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation, 529 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see Barany v. Buller, 670
F.2d 726, 736 (7th Cir. 1982) (federal common law not preempted by the Federal Credit
Union Act because the Act did not provide the "aggrieved [party] at least a reasonable fac-
simile of the relief sought under federal common law remedies.").
41 Chicago Park District v. Sanitary District of Hammond, 530 F. Supp. 291, 293
(N.D. M11. 981).
42 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
43 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at
20 n.31 (referring to S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1971)).
"Many states have statutes declaring water pollution to be a public nuisance. See,
e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 691.1, 691.307(c) (Purdon Supp. 1982-83).
Is See generally Begley & Williams, supra note 15, at 543-44. Other torts, such as
trespass and negligence, also are important in determining responsibility for abandoned
mine drainage. However, these torts generally are restricted to actions between individ-
uals; thus, nuisance has become by far the most widely applied tort in pollution cases.
One commentator has suggested that a private cause of action may exist under
federal common law of nuisance. See V. YANNACONE, JR., B. COHEN & S. DAVISON, EN-
VIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 25 (Supp. 1981).4 6 Commonwealth v. South Covington & Cinc. St. Ry. Co. 205 S.W. 581, 583 (Ky.
1918).
47 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 574 (4th ed. 1971).
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In the past it was held that a defendant had to be negligent in
allowing a nuisance to continue in order to be liable for a nui-
sance which was within the defendant's control but which he did
not create. 48 The doctrine set forth in the English case of Rylands
v. Fletcher49 has been rejected as too severe;53 the Rylands doc-
trine holds that one who keeps a dangerous condition or activity
on his or her land so as to be an unnatural use of the land is abso-
lutely liable for any damages caused as a natural consequence of
the escape of the dangerous," condition or activity. In Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection v. Exxon Corp. ,- the court
held that "mere ownership of property without anything more
cannot and should not be the determinative factor in imposing li-
ability."53 The court refused to hold the defendant liable under a
theory of common law nuisance since the defendant did not
create the condition causing the nuisance and the mere inaction
of the owner of the land was not unreasonable.54
Recently, the doctrine expressed in the older cases has been
applied more liberally, and conduct which would have once
48 See, e.g., Terrell v. Alabama Water Serv. Co., 15 So. 2d 727, 730 (Ala. 1943). In
Terrell the court held that if the defendant did not by his affirmative act create the nui-
sance, the only possible basis for liability would be that he failed to exercise due care in al-
lowing it to continue. Furthermore, if the defendant exercised due care in removing the
condition giving rise to the nuisance and the nuisance still persisted, he would not be liable
in the same manner as one who had created the nuisance by affirmative act. Id. Accord
Adams v. Baltimore Transit Co., 100 A.2d 781, 787 (Md. 1953). According to RFSTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 839 (1979), a possessor of land who fails to abate a nuisance
caused by an abatable artificial condition not created by the possessor is liable if the claim
is otherwise actionable, the possessor knows or should know of the condition and the risk
-caused by it, the possessor knows or should know that those affected by the nuisance have
not consented to it, and the possessor has failed, after reasonable opportunity, to take steps
to abate it.
49 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (1868). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 505-08.
'0 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky. 1953). The Sawyers
court felt that the Rylands v. Fletcher doctrine should not apply when the owner's use of
the land was a reasonable one. It held that, since the defendant's use of his land was
reasonable, the plaintiff could not recover for contamination of his water well, which he
alleged was the result of the defendant's drilling a gas well on the adjacent property. The
court stated that "in the absence of negligence there is no liability if there was a legitimate
and reasonable use." Id.
51 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 505.
52 376 A.2d 1339 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
53 Id. at 1349.
54 Id. at 1349-50.
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been considered reasonable has been deemed an adoption or con-
tinuance of the nuisance, giving rise to liability of the owner of
property on which the nuisance exists. In Commonwealth v.
Barnes & Tucker Co.,- it was held that even though a mere
owner of land cannot be required to abate a public nuisance on
his land where his ownership is unrelated to the conditions re-
sulting in the nuisance, conducting mining operations is an activ-
ity which constitutes a continuance of the nuisance; therefore,
the operator is responsible for abating the existing nuisance. 0
Relying on Barnes & Tucker, the court in Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp. v. Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources,57 held a lessor-owner of land responsible for
the abatement of pollution created by the lessee.0 Since the suc-
cessors in title to the party creating the nuisance "considered and
then decided against divesting themselves of the business" after
learning of the existence of the pollution, they had "engaged in
affirmative conduct [indicating] an adoption of the condition,"
thereby incurring liability for the pre-existing nuisance.59 This
decision represents a significant expansion of liability for con-
tinuation of a nuisance.
Under Philadelphia Chewing Gum, a mere purchaser of land
on which an abandoned mine is located who learns of the exis-
tence of polluting drainage from the mine after the purchase and
does not attempt to rescind the purchase can be held to have
"adopted" or "continued" the nuisance and thereby be responsi-
ble for its abatement. Furthermore, liability could be imposed if
5 353 A.2d 471 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976), affd, 371 A.2d461 (Pa. 1977).
M Id. at 479. Drainage from an abandoned mine on property adjacent to the defen-
,dant's had entered the defendant's mine. The defendant was ordered to abate the pollu-
tion emanating from its own property, as well as that entering its property from the adja-
cent abandoned mines.
57 387 A.2d 142 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
5 Id. at 152.
59 Id. at 151. The court in Philadelphia Chewing Gum held that a landowner could
not be required to "abate a public nuisance existing on his land where such ownership is
unrelated to the forces or conditions resulting in a public nuisance." Id. at 149 (quoting
from Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 353 A.2d at 478). However, the court also
cited with approval Commonwealth v. Wyeth Laboratories, Div. of Am. Home Products
Corp., 315 A.2d 648 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974), indicating that the rule set forth in Wyeth
was still viable-that a person may be required to abate a nuisance created in the lawful
use of the land under certain circumstances. 315 A.2d at 653.
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the purchaser was aware, or in the exercise of due care would
have been aware, of the pollution before the purchase. Such ap-
plications of the doctrine approach the severity of a strict liability
rule and undoubtedly raise serious questions of constitution-
ality; ® nevertheless, given the current trend in the courts to ex-
pand traditional theories to their constitutional limits in attempts
to impose liability for environmental damage,6I such holdings are
likely.
III. THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND
RECLAMATION ACT OF 1977
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 19776
(SMCRA) was enacted to control the surface mining of coal and
the surface effects of underground mining of coal. One of
SMCRA's purposes is to "assure that surface mining operations
are so conducted as to protect the environment."'' This is accom-
plished largely through regulation of mining operations and
practices. 4 SMCRA provides for promulgation of regulations for
an interim program to remain in effect until superseded by the
permanent program! 5 The permanent program applies to all
"coal exploration and surface coal mining and reclamation oper-
ations" on non-Indian and non-federal lands, with certain nar-
row exceptions.6 Surface coal mining and reclamation oper-
ations are defined as "surface coal mining operations and all ac-
tivities necessary or indicental to the reclamation of such oper-
60 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 371 A.2d 461.
61 In Sprecher v. Adamson Co., 636 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1981), the California Supreme
Court held that an uphill landowner owed a duty of reasonable care to a downhill land-
owner with regard to natural conditions of the land. The uphill landowner was held liable
for damage to the downhill landowner's property caused by a landslide from the uphill
landowner's property.
62 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (Supp. IV 1980).
13 Id. § 1202(d).
6 See Swift, Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977 From A Coal Operator's Perspective, 25 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. ch. 4 (1979).
6 30 C.F.R. § 710.3(a) (1981).
66 Id. § 700.11. The exceptions are for the extraction of: 1) coal by a landowner for
his own noncommercial use; 2) coal for commercial use where the operation affects less
than 2 acres; 3) 250 tons of coal or less, and 4) coal incidental to the construction of a gov-
ernment-financed highway. See also id. § 701.11.
67 30 C.F.R. § 700.5 (1981).
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ations." 6 Reclamation is defined as "those actions taken to re-
store mined land as required by this chapter to a postmining land
use approved by the regulatory authority."' 8
Under the permanent program regulations, "the person who
conducts" mining activities must control drainage from mining
activities."9 A person who merely purchases an abandoned coal
mine would not be conducting mining operations and therefore
would not be subject to the provisions of the regulatory program.
Further, the Secretary of the Interior mhy not exercise jurisdic-
tion for enforcement of SMCRA over one who is not an "oper-
ator" as that term is defined in the permanent regulatory pro-
gram. 70 An "operator" is defined as "any person engaged in coal
mining who removes or intends to remove more than 250 tons of
coal from the earth or from coal refuse piles by mining within 12
consecutive calendar months in any one location." 71 A mere pur-
chaser of an abandoned coal mine site would not be considered
an operator and therefore the SMCRA would not apply to such a
purchaser.
IV. THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act72 (FWPCA) is de-
signed to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical and bio-
logical integrity of the Nation's waters." 73 Two of FWPCA's goals
are achievement of "water quality which provides for the protec-
tion and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides
for recreation in and on the water" by July 1, 1983, and elimina-
tion of "the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters" by
6 Id. at § 701.5.
69 Id. § 816.41(d)(3), 817.41(d)(3). Section 816.41(d)(3) provides that "the person
who conducts surface mining activities shall operate and maintain the necessary water
treatment facilities for as long as treatment is required under this part."
70 See Shawnee Coal Co. v. Andrus, 661 F.2d 1083 (6th Cir. 1981). In Shawnee the
court held "the Secretary retains jurisdiction over an operator who has ceased removing
coal until the reclamation activities are completed." Id. at 1094. The court did not reach
the question of whether one who has completed reclamation but conducts other activities
in connection with a surface mining operation would be considered an operator. Id.
71 30 C.F.R. § 701.5 (1981).
72 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
73 See id. § 1251(a).
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1985. 74 In 1972, the FWPCA was amended7 to shift the emphasis
from enforcement of water quality standards to control of the
discharge of pollutants at their source.7 Under the FWPCA, any
discharge of pollutants into navigable waters without a permit is
unlawful.77
In recognition of the serious threat that acid mine drainage
poses to our nation's waters, the FWPCA provides for the study
of mine water pollution through projects which demonstrate
abatement techniques for control and elimination of acid and
other mine water pollution.78 A demonstration program also is
planned to clean up abandoned state-owned mines for use as
hazardous waste disposal sites.79 However, these programs are
designed only to study the program, not regulate it. Regulation
of pollution is accomplished under the National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System80 (NPDES).
Section 1311 makes the discharge of any pollutant unlawful
if not in compliance with FWPCA.81 "Discharge of pollutant" is
defined to include "any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source."82 "Pollutant" includes solid waste
discharged into water."' The term "point source" is defined as
a any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including
but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated ani-
mal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from
which pollutants are or may be discharged." 4
To comply with the FWPCA, one must obtain a permit be-
fore discharging any pollutant. Section 1311(b) requires all point
74 See id.
75 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (Oct. 18, 1972).
70 Keppler, Mining and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, 20 RocKy MTN. Mmn. L. INsT. 501, 503-04 (1975).
733 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976).
78 Id. § 1257.
79 Id. § 1257a (Supp. IV 1980).
80 Id. § 1342 (1976).8 1 Id. § 1311.
82 Id. § 1362(12).
83 Id. § 1362(6). "Solid waste" is defined to include discarded material, including
liquid or semi-solid material, from mining activities. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1976).
84 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. IV 1980).
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sources to achieve effluent limitations which require the applica-
tion of the "best practicable control technology currently avail-
able" by July 1, 1977,8 application of the "best available technol-
ogy economically achievable" as determined by regulations is-
sued by the Administrator, 6 and application of the "best conven-
tional pollutant control technology" available by July 1, 1984. 7
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator is to
promulgate effluent limitations guidelines for point source cat-
egories after consulting with appropriate federal and state agen-
cies and interested persons. m These guidelines are to be incorpo-
rated in the NPDES permits.
Although Congress, in drafting the FWPCA, indicated it did
not consider drainage from mining activities to be from point
sources,8 9 the EPA Administrator has promulgated regulations
setting forth effluent limitations guidelines for the coal mining
point source category.9o Also, it is recognized now that the
FWPCA should be read broadly in order to facilitate the achieve-
ment of its goals. 91 Any activity discharging pollutants from a dis-
cernible site will be subjected to the NPDES program, even if no
evidence exists that Congress coitemplated applying the pro-
gram to the activity. 92 In National Wildlife Federation v.
Gorsuch,93 the court stated that "the NPDES program was in-
tended to be comprehensive" 4 and that the FWPCA should be
interpreted, "whenever possible, and reasonable, to subject pol-
lution sources to NPDES control." 95
In Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,98 runoff from a coal
85 Id. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976).
86 Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
87 Id. § 1311(b)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 1980).
8 Id. § 1314(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
89 See id. §§ 1314(0(B) & 1288(b)(2)(G).
90 See 40 C.F.R. § 434 (1981). Presently these regulations do not apply to post-min-
ing discharges. Seegenerally note 118 infra.
91 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1982).
92 Id. at 1304.
93 Id. at 1291.
95 Id. at 1306. The court in Gorsuch held that mining activities, even though specif-
ically listed as nonpoint sources, should be subject to control under the NPDES whenever
possible. Id. at 1305.
96 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
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storage pile which originated as rainfall was held to be from a
nonpoint source. 97 Since the Appalachian Power case, the courts
have greatly expanded the variety of discharges held to be point
sources. In United States v. Earth Sciences,98 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that "[m]ining... may involve dis-
charges from both point and nonpoint sources, and those from
point sources are subject to regulation."99 The court found that
overflows from the leaching system at the defendant's gold mine
were discharged from point sources even though the system was
intended to be a closed system with no discharges and the over-
flows were caused by an unusually rapid snowmelt.110
In Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co., 101 excess rainfall
caused an overflow from a sediment basin and erosion of piles of
discarded material at a strip mine site. The court held that while
the FWPCA excludes "natural rainfall drainage over a broad
area" from regulation under the NPDES program, "[c]onvey-
ances of pollution formed either as the result of natural erosion or
by material means, . . . may [constitute point sources]."102 The
fact that the discharges are caused by gravity flow and that the
miners have done nothing more than collect rock and other mate-
rials does not preclude characterization as point sources.'0 In
O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc. 10o discharges from the defen-
dant's landfill which reached waters from "gullies, trenches and
ditches" and "broken dirt berms" were held to be from point
sources.0 5 The court stated that "the surface runoff of contam-
inated waters, once channeled or collected, constitutes discharge
by a point source."e°
97 Id. at 1373.
98 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1978).
9 Id. at 373.
'o' Id. at 374. Cf. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Prod., Inc., 487 F.
Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In Oxford Royal Mushroom the district court denied the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss, saying it could not conclude as a matter of law that discharges
from a break in a dirt berm around an irrigation field constituted discharges from non-
point sources. Id. at 854.
1'' 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980).
102 Id. at 44-45.
lO3Id. at 45.
104 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981).l0 Id. at 655.
106 Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co., 620 F.2d at 47).
[Vol. 71
STRICT LIABILITY FOR DRAINAGE
The Moyer's and Sierra Club cases both have important im-
plications for owners of abandoned mine sites. Such an owner
might make no changes whatsoever in the property, but the fact
that the waters were "once channeled or collected" by the mine
operator could bring contaminated runoff from the property
within the definition of point source, and thereby subject the
owner to liability if a permit is not obtained. The fact that the
present owner was not responsible for the channeling or collec-
tion might have little effect on a determination of the owner's li-
ability.
Section 1321 of the FWPCA prohibits the discharge of oil or
hazardous substances in quantities harmful to natural resources.
In United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,107 Marathon was
held liable for an oil discharge from its pipeline when a third
party broke the pipeline with a bulldozer. The court interpreted
Congress' intent in section 1321 as imposing liability on an owner
even in the absence of fault or intent, and that such an imposi-
tion was "well within the constitutional powers of Congress."l1a
Although section 1321 specifically refers to "owners" as being
within the group of persons liable, 1' such a specific reference
might not be necessary to bring a mere owner of a discharge
within the scope of liability under the NPDES.
In United States v. Board of Trustees of Florida Keys Com-
munity College,"0 the college's board was held to have author-
ized construction work which resulted in point source discharges
of pollutants, and the construction company was held liable for
violating FWPCA because it had not obtained the necessary per-
mits."' The company argued that its reliance on the board to ob-
tain the necessary permits absolved it from liability. In rejecting
the argument, the court stated that liability under the FWPCA is
107 589 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1978).
1o8 Id. at 1308. Imposing liability in Marathon Pipe Line is similar to the doctrine of
enterprise liability under which liability is placed, regardless of fault, on the enterprise
whose activities caused the injury. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 494 &
n.26. In United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310 (7th "Cir. 1978), a barge owner
was held liable for a discharge of oil from its barge without fault on its part, under the
same statute applied in the Marathon Pipe Line case.
109 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
'10 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
1' Id. at 274.
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based either upon performance of the work giving rise to the dis-
charge or upon responsibility for or control over the work."2 The
court held that "[clivil liability under [FWPCA] is not limited to
intentional violations,"" 3 and explained that the FWPCA makes
the "person responsible for the discharge of any pollutant strictly
liable.""4
As mentioned in Florida Keys Community College," 5 inter-
preting the FWPCA as imposing liability on the one who controls
or is responsible for the activity or condition giving rise to the vi-
olative discharge, as well as on the one who actually caused the
discharge, arguably is consistent with the intent of Congress,
given its strong interest in regulating such discharges.1 6 If such
an interpretation is adopted, a mere owner of an abandoned
mine from which acid mine drainage emanates might be con-
sidered to have "control over" the thing giving rise to the dis-
charge of pollutants-the abandoned mine. Such a broad inter-
pretation seems likely given the trend evinced by recent cases in-
terpreting the FWPCA.
The present regulations setting effluent limitations guidelines
for the coal mining point source category" 7 expressly exclude
drainage which is not from active mining areas." 8 On January
13, 1981, the EPA published proposed regulations setting new ef-
fluent limitations guidelines for the coal mining point source cat-
egory. "9 Although the proposed regulations contain effluent lim-
itations guidelines applicable to discharges from "post-mining
areas," 10 these guidelines apply only until release of the perfor-
112 Id.
11 Id.
"4 Id. (quoting from United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 374).
115 Id.
116 See United States v. Earth Sciences, 599 F.2d at 373.
117 40 C.F.R. § 434 (1981).
118 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 434.32(c) (1981); 40 C.F.R. § 434.35(c) (1981). "Active
mining area" is defined as "a place where work or other activity related to the extraction,
removal or recovery of coal is being conducted." Id. § 434.11(b).
119 46 Fed. Reg. 3136 (1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 434) (proposed Jan. 13,
1981). Corrections to the proposed rules were published at 46 Fed. Reg. 28,875 (May 29,
1981).
'10 46 Fed. Reg. 28,878 (1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 434.50) (proposed May
29,1981).
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mance bond.' No guidelines have been proposed which would
apply after release of the bond. However, the fact that no guide-
lines apply to a particular discharge will not exempt such dis-
charge from the NPDES permit program. The discharge per-
mit will still be required under section 1342(a)(1) of the
FWPCA.'1'
Much of the discharge from abandoned mines is from non-
point sources. 1 Section 1288 of the FWPCA regulates nonpoint
sources of pollution by establishing a system for state implemen-
tation of water quality management programs.las Designated
state areawide agencies or the states themselves are to administer
these programs.Ir2 Since participation is not mandatory-the in-
centive being federal grants for states which comply with section
12 881--most states have done little toward controlling nonpoint
sources of pollution. Responsibility for nonpoint source pollution
control was placed with the states because the primary method
for control is land use planning, and it was believed such plan-
ning should be left to local agencies. 12
While discharges from an abandoned mine which are con-
sidered point source discharges are subject to regulation under
the NPDES permit program, much pollution from an abandoned
mine is from nonpoint sources. Regulation of nonpoint sources is
121 See 46 Fed. Reg. 28,878 (1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 434.52(a)) (pro-
posed May 29, 1981).
122 See 46 Fed. Reg. 3145 (1981). See also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 50
U.S.L.W. 4434 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1982) (holding that the release of ordnance from aircraft
into navigable waters was a discharge of pollutants and that a NPDES permit was re-
quired even though no effluent limitations guidelines had been promulgated which ap-
plied to the discharge). Id. at 4435. The EPA is initiating a data collection effort to study
the feasibility of establishing effluent limitations guidelines which would be applicable
after bond release. 46 Fed. Reg. 3146 (1981).
123 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 252 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone
Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980) (dictum).
l2 46 Fed. Reg. 3145 (1981).
'25 See 40 C.F.R. § 35 (1981). See generally Wozniak, Nonpoint Source Water Pol-
lution And The Imposition of Effluent Limitations On Point Sources, 8 J. CoMPutrs,
TECH. & L. 117 (1980); Comment, Regulation of Nonpoint Sources of Water Pollution In
Oregon Under Section 208 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 60 On. L. REv. 184
(1981).
1' See 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a) (1976).
127 See id. § 1288(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
12 See Wozniak, supra note 125, at 125.
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much less defined and depends upon whether the property is lo-
cated in a state which regulates nonpoint sources.
V. THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF 1976
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976'2
(RCRA) is intended "to promote the protection of health and the
environment and to conserve valuable material and energy re-
sources." 13 The regulations promulgated by the EPA pursuant to
the RCRA establish a hazardous waste management system"'
which governs the handling and disposal of hazardous wastes
from "cradle to grave."'32
RCRA defines "solid waste" to include any solid, liquid,
semi-solid or contained gaseous material resulting from mining
operations."' Industrial discharges which are from point
sources' subject to permits under the FWPCA are excluded
from the definition of solid waste.'" The regulations define "haz-
ardous waste"' as any solid waste which exhibits any of the
characteristics of ignitability,137 corrosivity,"' reactivity' or tox-
icity, 40 or which is specifically listed as such.' 4' However, solid
waste from the extraction, beneficiation and processing of min-
erals, including coal, is expressly excluded from the definition of
hazardous waste. 42 This excludes from regulation under the
hazardous waste management program the exploration, mining,
cleaning, classification and other processing of coal. 1 This exclu-
129 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
130 Id. § 6902.
131 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-267 (1981).
132 See generally McGrath & Kulasza, Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal In The
Mineral Industries, 27A RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 65 (1982).
"3' 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1976).
134 See generally note 84 supra and accompanying text defining point source.
135 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1976).
'36 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1981).
137 Id. § 261.21.
13'Id. § 261.22.
139 Id. § 261.23.
140 Id. § 261.24.
141 Id. § 261.30.
142 Id. § 261.4(b)(7).
143 45 Fed. Reg. 76,619 (1980).
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sion might not be broad enough to exclude solid waste from an
abandoned mine site, since none of the above-listed activities
would be taking place. Therefore, any hazardous waste leaking'"
from an abandoned mine site into any waters, including ground-
waters, could be subject to regulation under the hazardous waste
management program.
Since neither mine drainage nor any of its components is in-
cluded in the EPA's list of specific hazardous wastes,4 5 it is neces-
sary to examine the defined characteristics of hazardous waste. 146
Corrosivity is defined to include any aqueous solid waste with a
pH of less than or equal to 2, or greater than or equal to 12.5.147
Since the pH of acid mine drainage could be near 2,14 and the
acidity of the drainage is likely to increase after mining oper-
ations have ceased if reclamation is not completed properly, 49 at
least a portion of the drainage from an abandoned mine could be
considered hazardous waste and, therefore, subject to regulation
under the hazardous waste management program. However, if
any of the acid mine drainage is considered to be emanating from
a point source, it would be excluded from coverage by the haz-
ardous waste management program'so by the exception for dis-
charge subject to FWPCA permits.
Under this program, any person who owns a "facility" for the
"disposal" of hazardous waste is required to obtain a permit for
such "disposal," and until one is obtained such "disposal" is pro-
hibited.' 5' "Facility" is defined to include "all contiguous
land.., used for.., disposing of hazardous waste."' 52 A land-
fill is considered a facility under this definition,',' but it is not
clear whether the phrase "used for" is meant to be so broadly
interpreted as to include land from which hazardous waste is
144 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1976) defines "disposal" to include leaking of any solid or
hazardous waste in such a way that it may enter the environment or any waters.
145 40 C.F.R. pt. 261, subpart D (1981).
146 Id. pt. 261, subpart C.147 Id. pt. 261.22(a)(1).
148 See Sludge Utilization, supra note 12.
149 See 42 Fed. Reg. 21,387 (1977).
1o 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(2) (1981). See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
151 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
152 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1981).
153 Id.
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leaking, when such leaking is not due to any affirmative act of
the owner. If so, one who merely owns land from which acid
mine drainage is leaking from nonpoint sources not covered by
an approved SMRCA permit'4 may be subject to regulation
under the RCRA hazardous waste management program.
The regulations are not clear, but the definition of "disposal
facility" should be considered when deciding whether to subject
to the program one who does not affirmatively "dispose" of (i.e.,
leak) hazardous waste from a "facility" (i.e., land). "Disposal fa-
cility" is defined as "a facility ... [at] which hazardous waste is
intentionally placed into or on any land or water, and at which
waste will remain after closure."'1 The regulations which estab-
lish standards for facilities refer to "hazardous waste facilities,"'
a term not found in the definitions.
The EPA Administrator has indicated that the regulations
which set facility standards will generally be applied to active fa-
cilities as opposed to inactive or abandoned facilities.'17 How-
ever, if an inactive facility interferes with operation of an active
facility, the inactive facility may be subject to some of the re-
quirements applicable to active faciities.1 Therefore, if a new
owner conducts an activity subject to the hazardous waste man-
agement program on land where an abandoned mine is located,
that owner may have to take certain steps to abate any discharge
from the abandoned mine which might interfere with the oper-
ation of the facility. In the absence of such circumstances, a mere
owner of an inactive mine should not be subject to regulation
under the hazardous waste management program.
Even if not subject to the program, the "imminent hazard"
provision of the RCRA159 would still apply to an abandoned mine
site. This provision permits the Administrator, upon receipt of
154 Regulations promulgated under the RCRA hazardous waste management pro-
gram do not apply to treatment, storage or disposal of coal mining wastes and overburden
which are covered by a surface coal mining and reclamation permit issued or approved
under the SMCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 6925() (Supp. IV 1980).
'W 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1981).
15 6 d. § 264.
'57 45 Fed. Beg. 33,154; 33,170 (1980).
158 Id.
159 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. IV 1980).
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"evidence that the handling, storage, treatment, transportation
or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the en-
vironment," to bring suit on behalf of the United States to imme-
diately enjoin any person "contributing to" such endangering ac-
tivity. '® Although the provision essentially codifies the common
law of public nuisance, the use of the phrase "contributing to"
expands its application to persons who would not be liable under
the common law. 16 This creates statutory strict liability for those
not responsible for the hazard but in possession of the land on
which the hazard is located.162
In the case of United States v. Price,' mere owners of prop-
erty once used as a landfill in which hazardous chemicals were
dumped were held to be "contributing to" the disposal (i.e., leak-
ing) of wastes "merely by virtue of their studied indifference to
the hazardous condition."' The defendant-owners had pur-
chased the property from the persons who had operated the land-
fill knowing of its use but not knowing that toxic chemicals had
been dumped there.16 The court held that they had a duty to "in-
vestigate the actual conditions that existed on the property or
take it as it was."'1 The court's interpretation of section 6973 is in
accord with the legislative history and the EPA's interpreta-
tion.167
In Price, the court also dealt with the issue of what consti-
tutes a "disposal" under the RCRA. In holding the owners liable
the court stated that "disposal" does not require any "active be-
havior," but merely allowing the wastes to leak will constitute a
"disposal.",68
The Price court also put to rest the notion that the federal
common law of nuisance is the source of the government's sub-
16o Id. § 6973(a).
161 See S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5019,5023.
162 Id.
1'3 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981).
11 Id. at 1073.
165 Id.1661d.
1
'6 See id. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,945; 58,984 (1978).
166 523 F. Supp. at 1073.
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stantive rights in cases brought under section 6973.'10 Neverthe-
less, the court did not go so far as to agree with the government in
its contention that a showing of irreparable harm is unnecessary
if the factors set forth in section 6973 are shown. 70 It held that
even though the statute provides for injunctive relief, it was
proper for the court to consider traditional equitable criteria in
determining whether an injunction should be issued.'7'
Under the Price court's interpretation of section 6973, a per-
son who merely owns land from which acid mine drainage is
emanating may be liable under that section if that drainage
created an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
the environment."'172 In United States v. Vertac Chemical Co. ,73
the court assessed the probability of harm and the seriousness of
potential injury in deciding that the discharge of dioxin, a highly
toxic substance, constituted an "imminent and substantial en-
dangerment."' 174 The court also noted that actual injury need
never occur, since the potential for injury is embraced by the
term "endangerment."175
While abandoned mine drainage does not pose as serious a
threat to health as does dioxin, it unquestionably poses a substan-
tial threat to the environment and to health. Moreover, the likeli-
hood of the occurrence of the threatened harm is much greater
due to the potential volume of the drainage.
169 See generally United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv. of New England, 496 F.
Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980); United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F.
Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980). In both of these cases it was held that § 6973 was merely in-
tended to confer jurisdiction upon the federal court and standing upon the EPA Adminis-
trator, but not to create any substantive rights. Both courts held that the federal common
law of nuisance should be applied to determine the substantive issues. It should, however,
be noted that both of these cases were decided before Milwaukee H, 451 U.S. at 304, dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
170 523 F. Supp. at 1067.
171 Id.
172 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. IV 1980).
173 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
'74 Id. at 885.
'
7 5 Id. The court held that in fashioning a remedy for an injury of the kind in this
case, it should "strike a proper balance between the benefits conferred and the hazards
created by [the defendant's activity]." Id. at 886. Such a holding appears to be based on
the enterprise liability theory. See note 108 supra.
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CONCLUSION
Drainage from abandoned coal mines presently poses a
greater threat to the environment than that from active mining
areas, but few regulations or statutes directly address the prob-
lems of fixing liability. Most existing rules must be extrapolated
from provisions not originally envisioned as encompassing such
situations. Probably the most directly applicable provisions are
found in various state statutes.
The FWPCA prescribes requirements if a point source is in-
volved; however, if the drainage is from a nonpoint source, state
statutes and regulations are the pertinent source of law under the
Water Quality Management Program of the FWPCA. SMCRA
does not apply to one who has not and does not intend to conduct
mining activities and therefore does not determine when such a
person will be limited. However, the RCRA imminent hazard
provision will hold liable one who contributes to a situation pos-
ing an imminent and substantial endangerment to the environ-
ment.
More statutory and regulatory controls of abandoned mine
drainage probably will be devised in the near future, given the
serious problem such drainage poses and the lack of present con-
trols. It also is likely, given the trend apparent in the statutes and
cases, that such controls will adopt rules of strict liability for
abandoned mine drainage based on mere ownership of property.
Michael D. Bryan
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